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Judicial Activism and the Nature of “Misuse of Private Information” 
 
Thomas DC Bennett* 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Writing in this issue, the former High Court judge, Sir Michael Tugendhat, sets out to correct 
a popular misunderstanding about the creative nature of the common law judge’s role.1 Those 
– most prominently, members of the tabloid press – who decry the judicial “activism” that 
they perceive as having led to the development of stronger privacy protections in English law 
have misunderstood what it is that common law judges do. For it is in the very nature of the 
common law to develop in order that it can adapt to broader social changes. This 
development can take place only through judicial elaboration of its doctrines and principles. 
Seen in this light, Tugendhat argues, the recognition and development of the cause of action 
known as “misuse of private information” (MPI) represents an entirely legitimate exercise of 
judicial creativity that is within the limits of the judiciary’s constitutional role. 
 
In the course of making his argument, Tugendhat suggests that the case of Campbell v Mirror 
Group Newspapers Ltd – the House of Lords case that laid the foundations for the emergence 
of the MPI doctrine – is an instance of (entirely legitimate) judicial activism.2 He is right to 
say that the development that takes place in that case is legitimate, since it sits well within the 
limits of the courts’ constitutional role. However, describing the case as “activist” is 
potentially problematic. For it intuitively suggests that the decision represents a fairly radical 
development of the law. “Activism” is an unhelpful label wherever it is applied. But insofar 
as it is suggestive of a radical rather than a limited development, Campbell is a case 
particularly unsuited to that label. Campbell involves only a limited development of the law 
pertaining to confidential information. As such, Tugendhat is certainly right that it is entirely 
defensible against criticism that it is an overly “activist” decision. But I would go further: it 
ought not to be considered “activist” at all.  
 
For rather than heralding the introduction of a distinct, novel cause of action apt to protect 
claimants’ privacy interests, the Campbell decision moved the law only slightly beyond the 
position it had, by that time, already reached through the older, equitable doctrine of 
confidence. This was in preference to recognising a broad tort of “invasion of privacy”, or 
even a number of discrete torts protecting distinct aspects of privacy.
3
 In making only 
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 [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457. 
3
 Four discrete privacy torts are recognised in the US under the Restatement of the Law (Second): Torts (2d), vol 
3 (American Law Institute, 1977), 376. (See also William Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48(3) Cal LR 383, 389.) In 
New Zealand, a “private facts” tort was recognised in Hosking v Runting (n 65, below). Both Ontario, Canada 
and New Zealand have, in recent years, recognised “intrusion” torts similar to that contained in the US 
relatively minor doctrinal changes to the position English law had already found itself in, the 
House of Lords threw its weight behind an unhelpful tendency to “shoe-horn” all types of 
privacy interests into a legal mechanism suited only to dealing with the non-consensual 
publication of private facts.
4
 This has left English law with an inflexibility in respect of 
protecting individuals’ privacy interests that has given rise to considerable uncertainty. In this 
essay, I evidence and critique one particular instance of this uncertainty: the confusion 
surrounding the very nature of the MPI doctrine. It is unclear whether the doctrine is part of 
tort law, or equity, or – perhaps – something else entirely. And whilst the courts have been 
forced recently to grapple with this conundrum, detailed analysis of their efforts reveals that 
the question has not been satisfactorily settled.
5
 
 
As such, Campbell may indeed be criticised for undermining legal certainty. But this 
uncertainty stems not from its activism but from its inactivism. The ambiguity surrounding 
the nature of MPI comes from equivocation in Campbell about its existence, its contours and 
its doctrinal roots. The House missed an opportunity to recognise, unequivocally, a distinct 
tort of invasion of privacy (or to delineate discrete privacy torts). Had it been less cautious 
and taken this opportunity, at least one of the core concerns – a lack of certainty – raised by 
those who (mistakenly) bemoan its activism could have been avoided.  
 
1. Judicial Activism and Incrementalism 
 
“Judicial activism” is a term that is often used pejoratively as a label for judges’ decisions 
that extend the law in a particular field in a manner the critic finds illegitimate, usually on the 
grounds of a democratic deficit in the judicial decision-making process. Dyson Heydon, for 
example, uses it to mean the use of judicial power 
 
for a purpose other than that for which it was granted, namely doing justice 
according to law in the particular case. It means serving some function other 
than what is necessary for the decision of the particular dispute between the 
parties. Often the illegitimate function is the furthering of some political, moral 
or social programme: the law is seen not as the touchstone by which the case in 
hand is to be decided, but as a possible starting point or catalyst for developing 
a new system to solve a range of other cases.
6
 
 
Tugendhat’s defence of judicial activism points up the historical commitment in England to 
the judicial development of the common law. He reminds us that English judges have been 
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 Dyson Heydon, ‘Judicial Activism and the Death of the Rule of Law’ (2001-2004) 10 Otago Law Review 493, 
495. 
elaborating and expanding the common law for many hundreds of years without any need for 
the involvement of the legislature. There are those for whom the lack of legislative 
involvement inherent in the common law is simply wholly undemocratic, thus rendering the 
entire notion of common law unacceptable to them. Keith Ewing, for example, refuses to 
acknowledge a meaningful distinction between the sort of legitimate “judicial” law-making 
that Tugendhat defends and “legislative” activity. For Ewing, all law-making is legislative in 
character and is thus not a legitimate use of judicial power; it should always be left to an 
elected legislature. As a result, he takes the view that the judicial pronouncement of novel 
legal rules is an affront to democracy:  
 
[T]he judicial role ought to be a limited one: it is not the job of the judicial 
branch to make the law, in the sense of laying down rules of general 
application which will apply to people other than the parties in a dispute before 
the courts. That is a legislative function for which the judicial process is wholly 
unsuited. … 
 
It is perhaps inappropriate that law should be made in this way, and it is 
perhaps obvious that there should be no role for the common law proper in a 
properly functioning democracy. The common law is a process of law-making 
developed in a pre-democratic era, and maintained by a non-democratic form. 
All law, public or private, should be codified with a transparent democratic 
root.
7
 
 
This is obviously an extreme position. Ewing favours the adoption of an exhaustive civil code 
– along the lines of continental legal systems – in order to dispense with the need for any 
judicial creativity. His view is obviously incompatible with the common law system that 
prevails in England and Wales and, as such, it is not a view with which Tugendhat’s defence 
of activism can usefully engage. It does, however, usefully demonstrate just how far an 
absolute commitment to democratic involvement in law-making might take us down a path of 
highly prescriptive formalism. 
 
Criticism of judicial activism features centrally (although not in so many words) in the attack 
launched by the Editor in Chief of the Daily Mail, Paul Dacre, on the development of the 
doctrine of misuse of private information. Addressing the Society of Editors in 2008, Dacre 
said that 
 
the British Press is having a privacy law imposed on it … This law is not 
coming from Parliament – no, that would smack of democracy – but from the 
… judgements … of one man.8 
                                                          
7
 KD Ewing, ‘A Theory of Democratic Adjudication: Towards a Representative, Accountable and Independent 
Judiciary’ (2000) 38(3) Alberta LR 708, 710. 
8
 Speech by Daily Mail editor-in-chief Paul Dacre at the Society of Editors conference, 9 November 2008. The 
transcript can be found at  
˂http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Media/documents/2008/11/07/DacreSpeech.pdf˃ (accessed 18/4/18). 
 The “one man” that Dacre was referring to was Mr Justice Eady, a High Court judge who, 
having at one time occupied the role of judge in charge of the jury list, has heard a substantial 
number of the MPI cases brought before the courts. Much in Dacre’s speech is not worth 
dignifying with a detailed reply, since one suspects – given his highly selective antipathy 
towards judicial creativity – that he simply objects to the development of greater legal 
privacy protections per se.
9
 But the suggestion that only Parliament, and not judges, ought to 
be driving the development of privacy law is one that others have subsequently pursued. The 
then Prime Minister, David Cameron, indicated broad agreement with Dacre’s sentiments 
when, in 2011, he said that 
 
What’s happening here is that judges are using the European Convention on 
Human Rights to deliver a sort of privacy law without Parliament saying so. … 
The judges are creating a sort of privacy law whereas what ought to happen in 
a parliamentary democracy is Parliament … should decide how much 
protection do we want for individuals and how much freedom of the press.
10
 
 
Tugendhat is, therefore, quite right to identify this line of argument as one that needs a 
response. Responding to it, however, is not easy when the charge – “activism” – is an under-
determinate one. Put simply, what amounts to “activism” is entirely in the eye of the 
beholder, and the perspective from which the beholder views it is rarely obvious to anyone 
else. For example, Dacre and Cameron might be read as espousing the Ewing view. However, 
that would hardly cohere with Cameron’s conservative instincts (which would, surely, 
compel him to defend Britain’s common law tradition). Nor would it sit well with Dacre’s 
well-known Euroscepticism (which would surely make it difficult for him coherently to argue 
for a continental-style civil code to be adopted in the UK). So it seems more likely that they 
would, unlike Ewing, accept some degree of judicial law-making, but it is wholly unclear 
where they think the line ought to be drawn.  
 
The problem with the term “activism” is that it tries – and fails – to capture a nuanced scale 
of approaches to judging with a simple, black and white dichotomy (between “activism” and 
“inactivism”). It is a blunt instrument. The reality is that judicial creativity contains many 
different shades of grey. Some decisions develop the law further from its previous position 
than others. As Lord Goff once put it: 
 
Occasionally, a judicial development of the law will be of a more radical 
nature, constituting a departure, even a major departure, from what has 
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previously been considered to be established principle, and leading to a 
realignment of subsidiary principles within that branch of the law.
11
 
 
Many decisions, however, will make only piecemeal changes to existing doctrine. One way in 
which we might better conceive of the spectrum of activism is by utilising Lesley Dolding 
and Richard Mullender’s notions of “narrow” and “wide” forms of incrementalism as the 
basis for this scale. Incrementalism is the term they (and others) use to describe the process 
by which the judiciary incrementally extend the law (eg in tort) to respond to novel situations. 
This is most obviously achieved by adopting an analogical method of reasoning – locating 
similarities of fact or of underlying legal principle between earlier cases and the instant case. 
As a mode of judging, it has its roots in the judgment of Brennan J in the Australian High 
Court negligence case of Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman, in which he stated: 
 
It is preferable … that the law should develop novel categories of negligence 
incrementally and by analogy with existing categories, rather than by massive 
extension of a prima facie duty of care…12  
 
Although this approach was not actually adopted by the majority in Sutherland, it was seized 
upon by the House of Lords in the famous negligence case of Caparo v Dickman Plc and has 
become integral to the methodology of English tort law.
13
 In recent years, moreover, the 
concept of incrementalism has been promoted as a way of ensuring judicial law-making 
throughout private law remains within the limits of the courts’ constitutional role.14 
 
The “narrow” and “wide” forms of incrementalism identified by Dolding and Mullender 
provide useful points on a scale of activism (though neither represent the absolute extremes). 
“Narrow incrementalism” is a form of adjudication that is “doctrine-bound” and tends in the 
direction of formalism. A judge operating in the narrow incremental mode would, for 
example, impose liability in novel circumstances only if a “tight analogy” with existing 
precedent could be drawn. One advantage of narrow incrementalism, for its proponents, is 
that it ensures relatively strong continuity in a given field.
15
 As such, it promotes a degree of 
legal certainty – something that is frequently cited as a core element of the rule of law, 
particularly by those who espouse a formalistic conception of the rule of law, such as Joseph 
Raz.
16
 In other words, narrow incrementalism is perceived as a recipe for legitimacy in the 
judicial elaboration of the common law, on the basis that it promotes a core rule of law value. 
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By contrast, “wide incrementalism” does not regard the absence of a tightly similar precedent 
as necessarily fatal to a novel claim. Instead, it treats precedent as a source of guidance as to 
the principles that underpin a particular field of law (such as tort) and which might indicate 
the direction in which the law ought to develop. Wide incrementalism is thus significantly 
more receptive to “strongly novel claims” than the narrow variant.17 
 
Judicial activism is thus not an all-or-nothing concept but a matter of degree. Some decisions 
tend more to the wide end of the spectrum than others. But providing a decision remains 
plausibly connected to precedent – whether by tight factual analogy or by embracing the 
same underlying principle – the decision remains “incremental”. So long as this is the case 
then the decision remains within the constitutional limits of the judicial role.
18
 It is 
Tugendhat’s argument that many English judicial decisions – particularly within the 
controversial field of privacy – sit defensibly within the constitutional limits on the 
judiciary’s law-making power. He is quite right. But for the reasons we shall consider in the 
next section, the case of Campbell is actually a case that sits towards the narrow end of the 
incrementalism spectrum we have identified. As such, identifying it as “activist” is 
potentially problematic, since it may encourage the mistaken belief that the case implemented 
a more radical change in the law than it really did. 
 
2. When is a Tort not a Tort? 
 
Despite considerable time having been spent analysing the intricacies of the Campbell ruling, 
academics have not really engaged with one of the biggest doctrinal questions that the case 
raises; whether the House of Lords actually developed a novel cause of action. Neither had 
judges engaged with this question until a recent case – Vidal-Hall v Google Inc – required 
them to do so.
19
 For despite the appearance of novel nomenclature – “misuse of private 
information” – in that case, there is no unequivocal evidence in the judgments of an intention 
to recognise a new tort. The prevailing wisdom amongst most privacy academics at present is 
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that, somehow, MPI was developed from the equitable doctrine of confidence in that case.
20
 
But a satisfactory answer to the question of just how this was achieved remains elusive. It is 
also unclear whether MPI is equitable, tortious or something else entirely. In other words, the 
very nature of the cause of action Campbell is credited with (and criticised by some for) 
bringing into being is unclear. This is significant because even those who criticise Campbell 
for being overly activist would have cause to be troubled by the uncertainty that this lack of 
clarity has engendered. This uncertainty caused some procedural problems that the courts had 
to grapple with in Vidal-Hall (to which we shall return, below). It also raises questions 
(which it is beyond the scope of this essay to attempt to answer) about the basis for damages 
awards. For instance, it is not clear whether MPI damages ought to be assessed as tortious 
damages or as equitable damages in lieu of injunctive relief. Traditionally, tortious damages 
have been based on the loss incurred by the claimant, whilst equity reacts to unjustified gain 
by the defendant, and so the bases for these different sorts of awards are distinct. Whilst it 
could be argued that the common law and equity are now effectively fused so as to make 
these sorts of traditional distinctions irrelevant, full fusion has never been unequivocally 
confirmed by the courts. Moreover, those who would oppose the judicial recognition of 
fusion would tend to be the same sort of formalism-inclined critics who oppose judicial 
activism. As we have noted, proponents of a tightly limited creative role for the courts tend to 
prioritise legal certainty. A failure to achieve it ought to cause such critics considerable 
consternation. 
 
It is not the aim of this essay to provide the elusive answer to the question of just how MPI 
emerged in a legal system that previously recognised only equitable confidentiality as a 
mainstream privacy doctrine. Instead, the essay aims to achieve three more modest things in 
the analysis that follows. First, it will demonstrate that Campbell can properly be considered 
a decision involving only limited – narrowly incremental – activism. Second, it will evidence 
and highlight the fact that there is an enduring lack of clarity as to the nature of MPI. Third, 
the consequences of this lack of clarity for the legal certainty that anti-activist critics tend to 
prioritise will be explored. In order to achieve these aims, two elements of the Campbell 
decision must be examined. We will first consider the doctrinal changes wrought as a matter 
of formal law. We then need also to consider subsequent judicial statements about the 
implications of those doctrinal developments. 
 
2.1 The Judgments in Campbell 
 
Campbell was pleaded in breach of confidence.
21
 Yet because both novel nomenclature and at 
least one novel formulation of the test for liability emerge from the House of Lords’ opinions 
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in the case,
22
 it is unclear whether the claim was disposed of using the same cause of action 
as that within which it was pleaded. As a matter of formal law, the doctrine emerging from 
Campbell is distinct from, though still reminiscent of, the law of confidence. Gavin Phillipson 
summarises the Campbell “transformation” of breach of confidence thus: 
 
[T]he second limb of the breach of confidence action – requiring that there 
must, in addition to being unauthorised use of confidential information, be 
‘circumstances importing an obligation of confidence’ – has been removed. 
Meanwhile, the first limb – that the information must have ‘the quality of 
confidence’ – has been transformed: the notion that the information must be 
‘confidential’ has morphed into a requirement that it be ‘private’ or ‘personal’ 
information.
23
  
 
This “transformation”, however, raises the question of just what has happened to the 
equitable doctrine of confidence. It is far from obvious whether that cause of action endures 
but with a new formulation, or whether it has been replaced by a new, tortious formulation, or 
whether a novel cause of action has been recognised that, whilst similar to the doctrine of 
confidence, exists separately from it. The first option would rule out MPI being regarded as a 
separate doctrine, whilst the second would rule out the possibility that equitable confidence 
could continue to exist in its own right along its original lines. The third option would 
logically permit both MPI and equitable confidence to have their own, separate existences, 
and so it today seems the most ostensibly plausible.
24
 But this third option would raise further 
questions about the extent to which MPI is conceptually distinct from equitable confidence; 
whether it is a branch of the equitable tree (which, presumably, would render it equitable), 
whether it is a sui generis tort, or whether it is something entirely new (perhaps some sort of 
hybrid). 
 
The opinions of their Lordships in Campbell are ambiguous on these points. The majority – 
Lord Hope (to whose judgment we will shortly return), Lord Carswell and Baroness Hale – 
refer to the doctrine in terms of equitable confidence. Although Baroness Hale recognises 
novel methodology, including the adoption of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, she 
is also adamant that the law can develop only in a very limited fashion. She is clear that “the 
courts will not invent a new cause of action to cover types of activity which were not 
previously covered” and that “our law cannot, even if it wanted to, develop a general tort of 
invasion of privacy.”25 Lord Carswell, giving the shortest judgment in the case, believes the 
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 Campbell, n 2, [133]. 
court’s decision comes down to “the application of reasonably well settled principles”, rather 
than the development of anything particularly novel or radical.
26
 
 
Lord Nicholls refers to the privacy action using novel nomenclature (“misuse of private 
information”).27 However, he also talks of the existence of only one such cause of action.28 
Indeed, he is consistent in referring only to one cause of action, which he initially describes in 
equitable terms
29
 before moving to “better encapsulate[]” it by calling it a “tort of misuse of 
private information”.30 He regards the old breach of confidence “nomenclature” as 
“misleading”.31 Lord Nicholls believes that the principle underpinning MPI, “however [the 
doctrine is] labelled”, is “respect for one [informational] aspect of an individual’s privacy”.32 
This, which is distinct from the equitable principles underpinning traditional confidence 
doctrine, reveals the doctrine to have “changed its nature” following the earlier Spycatcher 
ruling.
33
 The doctrine, he says, has “firmly shaken off the … need for an initial confidential 
relationship”.34 In protecting privacy, the key question has become “whether in respect of the 
disclosed facts the person in question had a reasonable expectation of privacy.”35 Thus Lord 
Nicholls paints a picture, in Campbell, whereby the equitable doctrine of confidence morphs 
into “misuse of private information”. He does not, however, explain how this has been 
achieved.  
 
In his judgment in Campbell, Lord Hoffmann is not clear about how he sees the law as 
having developed, but there are indications that he perceives things in a different fashion 
from Lord Nicholls. He states that, following Spycatcher and the passing of the HRA, there 
“has been a shift in the centre of gravity of the action for breach of confidence when it is used 
as a remedy for the unjustified publication of personal information”.36 Thus,  
 
[i]nstead of the cause of action being based upon the duty of good faith 
applicable to confidential personal information and trade secrets alike, it 
focuses upon the protection of human autonomy and dignity – the right to 
control the dissemination of information about one’s private life and the right 
to the esteem and respect of other people.
37
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37
 Ibid. 
In this passage (and throughout the parts of his judgment where he discusses the development 
of the law of privacy), Lord Hoffmann hints at the emergence of a second branch of 
confidence law when he uses the qualifying statement “when it is used as a remedy for the 
unjustified publication of personal information”, since it suggests that, when the doctrine of 
confidence is used for other reasons – such as the protection of trade secrets – there has not 
been a shift in its centre of gravity. This whole passage could thus be read as supporting the 
notion that there is just one operative cause of action (if one reads down the qualifying 
statement), or as tentatively suggesting that a new cause of action has emerged from (and 
now sits alongside) the earlier one (if one reads it up). As such, Lord Hoffmann equivocates. 
And, when taken in context with his judgment in the later case of OBG,
38
 this equivocation 
indicates the presence of a disconcerting incoherence in his Lordship’s vision of the manner 
in which the law in this field has developed. It is also unclear (if he is in fact expressing some 
support for the notion of a new, parallel cause of action having come into being) whether he 
perceives the tangential line of authority dealing with private information as being tortious or 
equitable. For on the one hand, his discussion is rooted in confidence law and he continues to 
talk of “the action” in the singular sense.39 But on the other hand, he gives us the tense-
equivocal statement that “[b]reach of confidence was an equitable remedy and equity 
traditionally fastens on the conscience of one party to enforce equitable duties which arise out 
of his relationship with the other.”40 This sentence relates equity in both the past and present 
tenses to either the historical shape of the doctrine or to its 2004 shape and thereby somewhat 
obscures his meaning. 
 
Lord Hope’s judgment gives us a third way. He rejects Lord Hoffmann’s view that the centre 
of gravity within breach of confidence has shifted: “It seems to me that the balancing exercise 
to which that guidance is directed is essentially the same exercise, although it is plainly now 
more carefully focussed and more penetrating.”41 He initially sets out his analysis in the 
manner of the traditional elements of equitable confidence, asking whether the information in 
question is confidential. Like the other judges, however, he then goes on to undertake a 
balancing exercise between “free speech” and “privacy”.42 Lord Hope thus essentially applies 
the Spycatcher model of confidence to the facts of Campbell, with a nod to the need to 
balance the competing Art.8 and 10 rights when assessing the legitimacy of publication.
43
 
Whilst he uses the term “private” to describe the information later in the judgment,44 Lord 
Hope does so in the clear belief that it is this single action for breach of confidence that is 
operative, having been expanded to provide a remedy for breaches of informational privacy. 
His approach, then, is to reject the notion that there has been any significant change to the 
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doctrine of confidence post-Spycatcher (and thus he implicitly rejects the idea that the 
operative cause of action in Campbell is tortious rather than equitable). 
 
The analysis in this section gives us a basis upon which to conclude that Campbell is not a 
clear instance of significant judicial activism. The judgments within Campbell resemble 
“narrow incrementalism” more than they do its “wide” variant. First, there is no unequivocal 
statement of an intention to recognise a novel head of liability. Second, there is no 
unequivocal statement that the cause of action relied upon has changed its basis from being 
equitable to being tortious. Third, there is a clear rejection (in Baroness Hale’s judgment) of 
any suggestion that the court has recognised – or indeed that it could recognise – a general 
privacy tort, echoing the sentiments that Lord Hoffmann expressed just a year earlier in the 
case of Wainwright.
45
 Instead, she insists that the courts will respond only to “types of 
activities” already covered by an existing head of liability; the publication of private or 
confidential information was, of course, already covered (to an extent) by the doctrine of 
confidence. Fourth, although Lord Nicholls’ nomenclature, “misuse of private information”, 
has subsequently become the terminology associated with the Campbell doctrine, it was 
adopted only by him and, even within his own judgment, it does not indicate a clear intention 
to recognise a novel head of liability; he equivocates on the extent of MPI’s novelty, as we 
have seen. Fifth, it is not wholly clear what exactly the test for liability is under Campbell. As 
Moreham pointed out in 2005, as many as three distinct tests for liability appear to be 
deployed in the case. Subsequent cases have refined the methodology to the point that, today, 
there is no major concern about this.
46
 But there is certainly no great clarity provided by 
Campbell itself. This seems to be, in large part, due to the lack of consensus on the nature of 
the cause of action in play. 
 
At this stage, one further point about Campbell can be made. This is that the judgments 
within it indicate a broad concern that the House ought not to appear to be acting in a 
particularly activist fashion. In part, this can be comprehended by recalling that, in the early 
2000s, there was considerable academic debate as to the possible “horizontal effect” of the 
Human Rights Act 1998.
47
 Campbell was an opportunity for the House to clarify not only the 
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extent of the privacy protections available under the English common law, but also to give an 
indication of the manner in which it would give effect horizontally to the provisions of the 
HRA. Seen in this light, statements such as Baroness Hale’s that the courts “will not invent” 
new causes of action might be seen as laying down a marker for the extent of judicial 
creativity that could be expected in response to horizontal human rights claims. The 
judgments thus paint a picture – whether accurate or not – of a court committed to limiting 
creativity in the common law to the development of liability rules under existing heads of 
liability. This approach to common law development is a classic hallmark of the narrow 
incremental mode.
48
 So there is both evidence of narrowly incremental thinking taking place 
in Campbell, and a contextually appropriate explanation for it. 
 
Put simply, notwithstanding its status as a seminal case for privacy rights, formally speaking 
Campbell is something of a fudge. The House of Lords appears at pains not to appear activist. 
It emphasises (indeed, it arguably over-emphasises) the continuity between the methodology 
in earlier breach of confidence cases (including those after the coming into force of the 
Human Rights Act 1998) and downplays the notion that its ruling represents a significant, 
novel development. The result of this fudge is, troublingly, that subsequent courts had little 
evidence to indicate the nature of the cause of action that has come to be known as “misuse of 
private information”. Nobody had much of a clue whether we were now grappling with an 
equitable doctrine, a tort, or something else entirely. As we will shortly see, this situation 
could not endure indefinitely and eventually demanded a resolution. 
 
Before we move on, however, it is appropriate to highlight a possible objection to my 
argument. Chris Hunt has argued that Campbell represents a radical change in the law 
because it alters fundamentally the elements of the doctrine of confidence in a manner that 
does “impermissible violence” to that equitable action.49 He argues that the alteration to the 
law of confidence wrought by Lord Goff’s judgment in Spycatcher was itself an illegitimate 
and unprincipled change that was, technically speaking, merely obiter, and which Lord Goff 
himself may not have intended to be a definitive reworking of its elements. As such, Hunt 
argues that there was no need for the House in Campbell to adopt it as its starting point when 
it considered the elements of equitable confidence. Having established this to his satisfaction, 
Hunt goes on to argue that dispensing with the second limb of the Coco formulation of 
equitable confidence is a “radical” change to that doctrine, since it is unsupported by either 
precedent or principle.
50
 An objection to my argument might thus be raised along the lines of 
Hunt’s thesis – that Campbell ought properly to be considered a radical development of the 
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law because of the “harm” (as Alexandra Sims puts it) it has done to the equitable doctrine of 
confidence.
51
 
 
I would make two points in response to such an objection. First, Hunt’s diagnosis of 
Campbell’s radicalness is based firmly on his view that Lord Goff’s reformulation of 
equitable confidence in Spycatcher is simply not correct in law and ought not to have been 
followed by any subsequent court. As a matter of strict, formal law, this is a technically 
plausible position to take. But it does not hold much water as a statement of the position that 
the law had come to occupy – perhaps incorrectly, in strictly formal terms – by the time 
Campbell was decided. The Spycatcher formulation had unarguably come to be regarded 
judicially as an accurate statement of equitable confidence’s elements. Second, there is a 
strong undercurrent of formalism evident in Hunt’s argument. He is concerned that equitable 
confidence ought to retain its traditional shape. Moreover, if it is to develop, it ought not to 
do so in a manner that conflicts with what he identifies as its informing principles: “the twin 
policies of relationship preservation and of remedying unconscionable conduct”.52 In making 
these concerns the centrepiece of his argument, Hunt prioritises maintaining the traditional 
shape of an equitable doctrine over maintaining certainty in tort. His ideal solution to the 
problem he identifies is – perhaps surprisingly – the same as that which I criticise the House 
in Campbell for not pursuing: the recognition of a clearly distinct, novel privacy tort. There 
is, then, a problematic tension in Hunt’s argument (and in the arguments of those who take a 
similar line
53
) between his strong desire to maintain certainty in equity and his enthusiasm for 
the adoption of a wholly novel head of liability in tort, unrelated to equitable confidence. It is 
clearly difficult to consistently square a strong commitment to formal rule of law concerns 
such as the maintenance of legal certainty with the realisation that privacy interests are 
important and ought to be taken seriously by the common law. 
 
2.2 Post-Campbell cases 
 
I have documented elsewhere the impact that a decision not to recognise either a broad 
privacy tort or a discrete tort of “intrusion upon seclusion” has subsequently had on one 
aspect of the law.
54
 This is the rather unforeseeable – and formally difficult to explain – 
development of the “third party interests” doctrine, according to which the interests of 
individuals who are not party to the proceedings are nevertheless accorded significant weight 
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by the court when determining an MPI claim (which would normally be a purely bilateral 
affair between claimant and defendant). In this section, I explore another formal difficulty 
resulting from the decision in Campbell. This is the difficulty in determining the very nature 
of MPI – whether it is equitable, tortious, or something else entirely. 
 
Some post-Campbell privacy cases seem to confirm the existence of both traditional equitable 
confidentiality and MPI as separate causes of action with differing focuses,
55
 whilst others 
prefer the notion of a single, modified cause of action.
56
 And yet other cases equivocate on 
whether these comprise one cause of action with interchangeable names or two separate 
doctrines.
57
 A further possibility, barely touched upon in the case law, is that MPI is neither 
tortious nor equitable, but is instead something entirely new. Given the strong influence that 
the European Convention on Human Rights had on its development and content, the notion 
that it is a sort-of “hybrid”58 doctrine encompassing equitable, tortious and higher-order 
public law principles (i.e. Convention rights) is one that might at the very least have been 
worth exploring. It is hinted at in the Court of Appeal’s judgment in McKennitt, wherein 
Buxton LJ comments that Arts 8 and 10 of the ECHR are now “the very content of the 
domestic tort that the English court has to enforce” but the courts have not pursued that line 
of thinking with any vigour since he made those remarks in 2006.
59
 
 
To make matters worse, the confusion continues even within individual judgments in post-
Campbell privacy cases. The 2014 case of Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd highlights 
this problem.
60
 In Weller, Dingemans J identifies the claimants’ claim as “an action for 
breach of confidence”, remarking that this cause of action has been “renamed … misuse of 
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private information”.61 Elsewhere in the judgment, however, he paints a subtly different 
picture, for he tells us that “claims for misuse of private information were absorbed into the 
established claim for breach of confidence” some years ago.62 And in yet another place he 
identifies MPI as a “new cause of action”.63 Thus, in the space of just five paragraphs, 
Dingemans J stakes out three quite different positions on the nature of the claim at hand. It is 
highly unlikely that this was deliberate – indeed the learned judge may not even have 
considered the distinctions drawn within his own use of terminology.
64
 But this alone 
highlights the depth of the difficulty which the ambiguity surrounding this cause of action’s 
doctrinal roots has caused. 
 
The 2004 judgment of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Hosking v Runting is also 
revealing, since it provides an external perspective.
65
 In Hosking, the Court was presented 
with an opportunity to clarify the manner in which New Zealand law dealt with informational 
privacy violations. Given the option to expand the existing doctrine of confidence, the court 
preferred to recognise openly a novel head of tortious liability protecting private information. 
In so doing, the court established a “private facts” tort. The judgment sheds light on the 
confusion engendered by the ways in which the English law of confidence was put to use, 
between the House of Lords’ cases of Spycatcher in 1988 and Campbell (which was handed 
down shortly after Hosking) in 2004, in order to provide a remedy in cases dealing with the 
public disclosure of private matters.
66
 The New Zealand Court of Appeal, endeavouring to 
make sense of the English authorities, proclaimed that, by 2004 (just before the House of 
Lords’ decision in Campbell was handed down) English law recognised “two quite distinct 
versions of the tort of breach of confidence.”67 
 
One is the long-standing cause of action applicable alike to companies and 
private individuals under which remedies are available in respect of use or 
disclosure where the information has been communicated in confidence. … 
The second gives a right of action in respect of the publication of personal 
information of which the subject has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
irrespective of any burden of confidence… The first formulation reflects the 
historical approach to the law of torts with the focus on wrongful conduct 
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whereas the second reflects more the impact of a developing rights-based 
approach.
68
 
 
This statement is starkly indicative of the problem this doctrinal uncertainty has caused. For it 
contains mutually incompatible statements on the nature of the English causes of action. Thus 
the New Zealand Court of Appeal is led to identify (wrongly, at least at a formal level) the 
long-standing equitable doctrine of confidence as a tort (an error the English Court of Appeal 
also made in McKennitt).
69
 Having done so, it further recognises a second tort dealing with 
private, rather than confidential, information, which had apparently appeared at some point 
after Spycatcher but clearly before the House of Lords’ decision in Campbell (which had not 
been handed down when Hosking was decided). The fault here lies not with the judges in 
Hosking but rather with the confused state of English law at the time and the lack of a clear, 
universal understanding of its development. 
 
Ten years after Campbell, the English courts were required, for the first time, to decide 
whether MPI is a tortious or equitable cause of action in the case of Vidal-Hall v Google 
Inc.
70
 The claim was brought in respect of information obtained and (according to the 
claimants) misused by the defendant through the installation of “cookies” on their computers 
via their web browsers. At the case’s first hearing before Tugendhat J, in the High Court, this 
was decided as a preliminary matter; it was necessary to determine whether the claims – 
pleaded in both MPI and breach of confidence – were amenable to service upon Google Inc 
outside the jurisdiction of England and Wales. (Under the Civil Procedure Rules as they stood 
at the time, tort claims could be served extra-jurisdictionally, but non-tort claims could not.
71
) 
Tugendhat J concluded that MPI exists as a head of tortious liability, distinct from equitable 
confidentiality. The MPI claim could therefore be served, but a separate claim in breach of 
confidence – being equitable rather than tortious – could not.72  
 
Unfortunately, and most likely due to the necessarily brief nature of legal proceedings 
regarding preliminary issues, it must be said (with great respect) that the learned judge’s 
reasoning lacks the detail and depth needed to provide wholesome support for his conclusion. 
From the judgment, it is plain that Tugendhat J is convinced that MPI is tortious, but that he 
finds it difficult to pin down a great deal of supporting evidence.  
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The case of Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No.3) was relied on heavily by counsel for Google as they 
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73
 In Douglas (No.3), the claimants brought a 
claim in breach of confidence in order to protect their privacy in respect of surreptitiously-
taken photographs of their wedding ceremony in New York. This was the judgment in which 
the Court of Appeal infamously bemoaned that it could not 
 
… pretend [to] find it satisfactory to be required to shoe-horn within the cause 
of action of breach of confidence claims for publication of unauthorised 
photographs of a private occasion.
74
 
 
In Douglas (No.3) (which Tugendhat J cites) the Court of Appeal held that “the effect of 
shoe-horning this type of claim into the cause of action [for] breach of confidence means that 
it does not fall to be treated as a tort under English law”.75 The court in Douglas (No.3) was, 
at this point, considering whether s.9 of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1995 applied, a question which it answered in the negative. In Vidal-Hall, 
counsel for Google submitted that, in this part of Douglas (No.3), the court was referring to 
what Lord Nicholls had (in Campbell) called the tort of misuse of private information. 
Tugendhat J rejected this, holding that the Court of Appeal’s remarks in Douglas (No.3) 
referred to the equitable doctrine of confidence only. In support of this, Tugendhat J noted 
that this was the only possible doctrine to which the judge in Douglas (No.3), Lindsay J, 
could have been referring, given that the first instance decision pre-dated Campbell by nearly 
a year.
76
 He also states that Lord Nicholls’ reference in OBG, four years after Campbell, to 
“two distinct causes of action” supports his conclusion that MPI and breach of confidence are 
separate from one another.
77
  
 
Tugendhat J concludes this portion of his judgment by looking (much more briskly) at cases 
in which his brethren on the bench have identified MPI in tortious terms. He notes that the 
phrase “misuse of private information” has become a legal term of art which has frequently, 
if not consistently, been identified by courts as a tort.
78
 These uses, he holds, “cannot be 
dismissed as all errors in the use of the words [sic] ‘tort’.”79 The Court of Appeal, when it 
considered Vidal-Hall, also pursued this line of reasoning, remarking that these judicial uses 
of the term “tort” in relation to MPI “connote an acknowledgement … of the true nature of 
the cause of action.”80 
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 However, whilst there may be some underlying, intuitive veracity to the notion that if 
something is generally treated as a tort then it probably is one, the mere repeated judicial use 
of the term “tort” is not, in itself, conclusive proof of its accuracy. For neither the common 
law nor equity has ever had much truck with the notion that labels provide conclusive proof 
of content. As Hunt puts it, “repetition does not transform a falsity into a truth”.81 Indeed, 
since Tugendhat J was the first judge to consider this question of MPI’s classification as a 
disputed point of law, it is apparent that no previous reference to the doctrine as tortious was 
founded on detailed judicial analysis or, indeed, detailed submissions from counsel, relating 
to its nature. This must call into question the reliability and suitability of those references for 
the purpose for which Tugendhat J uses them.  
 
When Vidal-Hall reached the Court of Appeal, the defendant repeated its argument based on 
the decision in Douglas (No.3). It argued that the identification of the basis of that claim as 
equitable amounted to a binding declaration that the only cause of action available in these 
sorts of informational privacy cases was that one, same, equitable doctrine. The Court of 
Appeal rejects outright this argument of Google’s, remarking that the Douglas (No.3) 
observations were obiter rather than ratio.
82
  
 
The Court first notes counsel for Google’s “uncontroversial proposition” that, following the 
coming into force of the HRA, the gap in protection for Art.8 interests in respect of 
informational privacy was bridged by the courts “developing and adapting” the older 
equitable doctrine of confidence “to protect [claimants from] the misuse of private 
information”.83 The Court points to the decision in A v B as an example of that process, 
wherein the Court of Appeal “absorb[ed] the rights which articles 8 and 10 protect into the 
long-established action for breach of confidence”.84 One unfortunate aspect of the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment becomes apparent at this point. This is that the Court is mobilising a range 
of under-determinate terminology in order to describe the developmental process by which 
privacy law developed in the early years of the HRA. The process is described as one of 
development, adaptation and absorption. There is a significant semantic tension between, on 
the one hand, these descriptions of the process and, on the other, the Court’s clear belief that 
“[a]lthough the process may have started as one of ‘absorption’ … it is clear that … there are 
now two separate and distinct causes of action”.85 For the descriptive terms used imply 
strong, internal continuity; they give rise to the intuitive understanding that a single cause of 
action has been “developed” and “adapted”, and that protection for a particular type of 
interest (i.e. privacy) has been “absorbed” into it. Thus, when the Court, just a paragraph 
later, subsequently asserts that two distinct actions now exist, it is not at all apparent that (and 
no explanation is offered of how) this can be the case. Given this rather baffling use of 
language, it is clear that this judgment, too, requires close scrutiny. 
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 When one unpacks the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Vidal-Hall, it becomes apparent that it 
rests upon three strands of argument.
86
 The three strands may be summarised as follows: (i) 
as a matter of substance, “confidentiality” and “privacy” are distinct from one another and 
give expression to “different interests”; (ii) the law is still developing, and the ongoing 
process of development that began as one of “absorbing” privacy claims within 
confidentiality has reached a point where “there are now two separate and distinct causes of 
action”; and (iii) MPI has frequently (if not always consistently) been referred to by the 
judiciary as a “tort”.87 Thus strand (i) is substantive, relating to the informing principles 
underpinning these causes of action, whilst (ii) and (iii) are essentially empirical (and purely 
descriptive) observations. 
 
At a formal level, these three strands of the Court’s reasoning are problematic. None of them 
gives any hint of the method by which the law relating to “confidentiality” and “privacy” has 
developed in such a way as to give expression to these “different interests”. They say nothing 
about the doctrinal roots of MPI. The judgment is also unhelpfully vague about just what 
these “different interests” in strand (i) are. We are likely to be on fairly safe ground if we 
assume the Court has in mind the protection of equitable ideals of trust and confidence (the 
maintenance of the relationship of trust between confidants) when it talks of 
“confidentiality”. We can similarly make the assumption (although we are arguably on less 
certain ground if we do
88
) that it is drawing on the sorts of dignity and autonomy-based 
concerns that the Strasbourg Court regards as central to Art.8 ECHR when it talks of 
“privacy”.89 
 
Moreover, (ii) is not really a strand of argument at all; rather it is the very question that the 
Court is considering. To simply assert that “there are now two separate and distinct causes of 
action” does not provide an explanation of how they came into being. Likewise strand (iii) 
says nothing about how MPI came into its own as a tort. Its reliance here on frequent judicial 
descriptions of MPI as a “tort” perhaps provides useful evidence that MPI appears, as a 
matter of semantic empiricism, to be identified frequently as tortious – but it cannot explain 
its emergence as a tort. We are thus left with a judgment that provides a bare answer to the 
question posed. Its reasoning does not – at any point – give any clue as to the Court’s 
understanding of just how MPI emerged as a tort.  
 
                                                          
86
 Ibid. These are summarised by the Court at [21]. 
87
 The Court of Appeal cites, as examples of MPI being described judicially as a “tort”, McKennitt, n 57; Lord 
Browne of Madingley v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 295, [2008] QB 103; Murray v Express 
Newspapers, n 56; Tchenguiz v Imerman, n 55. 
88
 Given the history of judicial reluctance to define “privacy” in English law, we probably have less secure 
grounds to assume this is the Court’s understanding of “privacy” than we had for making our assumptions about 
its understanding of “confidentiality”. 
89
 See, for example, Reklos v Greece [2009] EMLR 16, [39] (on “autonomy”); Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 
35 EHRR 1: “the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of [the] 
guarantees [in Article 8]”, (at [61]); “The very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity…” (at 
[65]). 
When the Court offers a (brief) account of the HRA era case law during which MPI has 
developed, it fares no better. For instance, the Court quite rightly identifies Lord Nicholls’ 
judgment in Campbell as “highly influential”.90 Yet the Court – despite regarding this as 
“highly influential” – does not explicitly state that Campbell was the point at which MPI 
emerged in tortious form. Instead, it leaps ahead (with an appropriately dramatic “four years 
later”) to the House of Lords’ decision in OBG (in which Lord Nicholls stated that the law 
had developed “two distinct causes of action” for confidence and privacy).91 Thus it leaves us 
with an analysis-free four-year period during which, presumably, the Court believes MPI 
gained its status as a distinct tort (without being conclusively labelled as such by our highest 
court). Bafflingly, it is on the developments in the law during this remarkable – and clearly 
highly significant – period of change that the Court is silent. 
 
The Court of Appeal rather lets the proverbial cat out of the bag when, in concluding on the 
issue of MPI’s classification, it remarks: 
 
if one puts aside the circumstances of its “birth”, there is nothing in the nature 
of the claim itself to suggest that the more natural classification of it as a tort 
is wrong.
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This is surely the clearest possible admission that the Court was unable to identify the 
“circumstances of [MPI’s] birth”. In this regard, it has thus fared no better than the High 
Court in its efforts (indeed, Tugendhat J’s analysis is the more detailed of the two). And so 
irrespective of the correctness (or otherwise) of the conclusion reached, the judgment leaves 
unanswered a key question: if MPI is tortious then how, as a matter of formal law, did it come 
into being? 
 
It has not been my aim to answer that question in this essay. But it is important to note that it 
has yet to be satisfactorily answered. For it arises directly because of the “shoe-horning” 
approach to the development of MPI to which English courts have committed themselves in 
the post-Campbell era. The insistence on “shoe-horning” privacy claims into the 
confidence/post-confidence vehicle is symptomatic of an approach to judging that 
determinedly restricts the development of the law to taking place on a narrowly incremental 
basis. This bears all the hallmarks of being based on a restrictive conception of the judicial 
role, related to a formalistic conception of the rule of law that prioritises the maintenance of 
legal certainty. Somewhat ironically, it is this deliberate subordination by the House of Lords 
of its creative powers to the restraining impulse of narrow incrementalism that has led to the 
considerable uncertainty and confusion that renders the very nature of the cause of action to 
which Campbell is credited with giving rise unclear. 
 
Conclusions 
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Critics might object to my argument by saying that, whatever the judges in Campbell might 
have said at the time, the manner in which the doctrine of MPI has subsequently been 
interpreted and applied by the lower courts indicates that what happened in Campbell was 
highly significant. For if we now have a new tort utilising a novel methodology that is 
providing relief in novel circumstances, is that not proof enough of Campbell’s activism? The 
argument behind such an objection is that there is no smoke without fire. Post hoc ergo 
propter hoc. 
 
To such an objection, I would respond that, as we have seen, there is no clear, formal 
evidence – either in Campbell itself or in subsequent cases – that Campbell heralded the 
recognition of a novel tort, only that it did … something. And suddenly we had this thing 
called “misuse of private information” and lawyers were scrabbling around wondering what 
to do with it, when to plead it, how it worked and which remedies it might help them secure 
for their clients. Whilst judges and academics alike have tended to assume that Campbell did 
give rise to a novel tort, there has been no detailed academic examination of the case law with 
the intention of proving it. The evidence we have examined in this essay casts doubt on 
whether this could indeed be proved. The existence of smoke does not prove the existence of 
a fire; many faulty things produce smoke. Moreover, whilst the High Court and Court of 
Appeal have agreed in the case of Vidal-Hall that MPI is tortious, the judicial analysis in 
those two cases is unconvincing, leaving a number of important questions entirely 
unanswered.  
 
Thus, even if MPI is tortious, its recognition was most certainly not the product of a clear, 
positive decision to recognise a novel tort. Rather its current status – recognised as a tort by 
the Court of Appeal – is simply one possible rationalisation of a hodgepodge of other 
decisions in which its status has not been in issue and was consequently not considered in any 
detail. 
 
Campbell itself was not a particularly activist decision. It moved the law relating to privacy 
along, but only to a limited extent. In taking this narrowly incremental approach, the House 
appears to have been keen to pre-empt and avoid criticism for being “activist” – that is, for 
undermining legal certainty and the rule of law. And yet it is demonstrable that taking this 
narrowly incremental approach has not given us the legal certainty in respect of our common 
law privacy protections that we might have expected. Indeed, it has led to considerable 
uncertainty both in respect of the “third party interests” doctrine upon which I have 
previously written elsewhere, and in respect of the very nature of the cause of action that 
Campbell is said to have given us. 
 
From this, it is entirely arguable that the House of Lords could more usefully have taken a 
significantly more activist approach in Campbell. Had the House of Lords recognised MPI as 
a novel and distinct tort there and then, the problem of uncertainty upon which we have dwelt 
would not have arisen, at least not in terms of the nature of the doctrine. A move to recognise 
clearly a novel, broadly-framed cause of action – most likely in tort – to guard against 
invasions of privacy, or to recognise a number of discrete torts to cover the same ground, 
would have required the House to operate in a significantly wider mode of incrementalism. 
But doing so would still have been defensible. For, as Sir Michael Tugendhat rightly 
contends, courts may legitimately extend – and have on a number of occasions legitimately 
extended – the law quite significantly. The key to engaging in defensible incrementalism is 
maintaining a link with past judicial decisions. But this need not mean a rigid adherence to 
the limits of existing precedent. It can legitimately mean recognising novel heads of liability 
where doing so is necessary in order, for example, to give effect to an underlying principle of 
justice.  
 
And whilst it is certainly not the only – and probably not even the primary – reason to think 
that such a move would have been beneficial, it might well have prevented the very problem 
of uncertainty by which those who tend to criticise “activist” decisions are particularly 
troubled. 
